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Abstract. The crises have spread out globally and have impacted industries, either large firms or small firms. These impacts make
the firms economically in intense trouble or file bankruptcies and lay off their employees, as their incomes are falling significantly
globally. Therefore, this study investigates how businesses can improve their resilience and be prepared to cope with crises and
threats in this disruptive era. What were the strategies the firm has implemented?.The authors have conducted this research in PT
Alpha by using the process Tracing case study method in semi-structured interviews with eight critical respondents in ten in-depth
interviews, split into a pilot study and the triangulation period based on those initial inputs. The authors have used process tracing
analysis to test the evidence. The results showed that the major businesses need to concentrate on the three phases as a process,
i.e., preparation and anticipation, coping and improvisation, and recovery and transformation, to be resilient (it is an enhancement
of the concept of Duchek, 2020). To have a more comprehensive view, the authors have extended the research from the economic
crises in 1998 and 2008 till 2019; thus, the process-tracing case study is a suitable method. This method has been used a lot for
historical settings. This paper recommends further research to expand the studies to other large established companies in similar
segments or other segments.
Keywords: Crises, Process-Tracing, Anticipation, Coping, Transformation

INTRODUCTION
It is not easy to be an organization that can withstand shocks because the world is increasingly
unpredictable quicker than resilient businesses. As a
consequence of market turmoil, technological turbulence, and competitive intensity (Jaworski and Kohli,
1993: p.55), companies must adapt to their sales and
strategies (Homburg and Pflesser, 2000). Companies
face more severe and significant disturbances (William
et al., 2017), both familiar and unfamiliar phenomena
(Amankwah-Amoah et al.,2020).
If these shocks or changes start to plague the company at its threshold level, anomalies or organizational
weakening may arise if they are misunderstood and
discounted, resulting in a company crisis (William
et al., 2017). Over the last century in S&P Index, the
large firm lifetime has decreased by 50 years from
1920 to 2020. Nearly three-quarters will be new companies (Cavaco, 2016). Amankwah-Amoah et al.
(2020) predicted that the year 2020 had been projected
to “set a record for called mega bankruptcies” due to
Covid-19. Likewise, in Indonesia, the bankruptcies
are about 600+ to 800+ companies every year, as
shown in Figure 1 (Appendix I) (Dun & Bradstreet
Worldwide Network, 2019).
The question now, how large companies cope with
such crises and still survive? Could they utilize existing strategies to maximize successful adaptation to
different contexts? Such questions are still valid points
for discussing the Organizational resilience topic connected with threats or crises.
The concept of crisis thus helps to resolve organizational resilience. If organizational resilience is
conceptualized as an outcome and a crisis-related

outcome, organizational resilience will emerge during
the crisis. This means that resilience is connected
to the outcome that organizations do well through
crises or interruptions (e.g., Horne and Orr 1998)
(Duchek, 2020:p.216). On the other hand, if resilience
is conceptualized as a process and related crisis-as-aprocess, it would be situated before the crisis. Then,
the actors can prepare it before the crisis occurs.
Consequently, a firm must check their firm actor’s
capabilities to interact with such external adversities
before the crisis, in crisis, and post the crisis (William
et al., 2017).
Most current organizational resilience studies focus
on organizational characteristics or resources that
appear significant for resilience (Duchek,2020:p.216).
It reflects that organizational resilience as an outcome.
However, what is uncertain is what strong companies
do and how organizational resilience can be exercised
in reality? (Boin and van Eeten, 2013; Duit, 2016).
Organizations need to find causal processes to create
organizational resilience while understanding how
they stay resilient.
Research on organizational resilience as a process
is still restricted (Ruiz-Martin et al., 2018: p.15), and
only a few researchers have attempted to explain the
resilience process in detail (Duchek, 2020:p.221).
Duchek (2020:p.224) answers this by proposing a
conceptual framework based on these three stages
of resilience (anticipation, coping, and adaptation)
and capabilities that underline these stages. Referring
to her concept, the authors have seen some limitations. If the organization has identified weak signals
of the threat, it should prepare a solution or a mitigating solution. Converse to her framework, in the
pre-crisis stage, it has not been shown. As such, the
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development of the required solution is missing in her
framework. Instead, she suggests that coping capabilities lie in the period when unexpected events occur.
This framework needs some modification because
it will be too late if solutions are made and implemented during a crisis. The timeline for sufficient to
develop a solution can refer to a more stable period
(Dervitsiotis, 2003: p.264). Duchek’s (2020:p.224)
study is related to a conceptual framework.
In the context of joint ventures, there are limited
studies. As per the authors’ knowledge, only Pal
(2013) studied empirically to develop organizational
resilience by suggesting diversification through alliance or joint venture. Their empirical findings show
that most of the firms operated on a joint venture
(JV) at low-cost bases are resilient (Pal, 2013: p.107).
Unfortunately, they do not specify how joint ventures
different from other firms, likewise, about the firms
in the disruptive era.
This paper aims to fill such a gap and to answer how
large established joint ventures remain resilient in a
disruptive era. This gap is also aligned with Annarelli
and Nonino’s (2016) future research agenda that suggests that anticipatory innovation enhances resilience
and strategic approaches and dynamic capabilities for
becoming a resilient organization. The authors will
suggest the capabilities built on the process that create
causal mechanisms to face the crises in these three
processes and the other crucial factors. The concept
of organizational resilience is the relevant literature to
answer organizational survival. In the authors’ framework, leadership and followership interactions are
critical to the three processes. Moreover, the study in
a large firm context in Indonesia has not been carried
out. To date, there is one organizational resilience
study (Suryaningtyas et al., 2019) which studies organizational resilience and organizational performance,
examining the mediating role of resilient leadership
and organizational culture in 3-star hotels and resorts
in two towns in East Java, Indonesia.
This study uses the process-tracing method, and
according to the authors' knowledge, it is used a few
in business and management research. Hence, this
research will also add to business and management
literature, particularly of the process-tracing method.
So, the authors will fill the gap in organizational resilience literature by completing this paper.
How Large Established Firms and Joint Ventures
Remain Resilient in Disruptive Era?
In this section, the authors will discuss (1) How
large established firms and joint ventures remain resilient in the disruptive era; (2) What drives firms and
joint ventures to survive in the disruptive era? An
established firm means a company that has existed
for an extended period and is respected or trusted by
people. A firm qualifies as large to meet at least two
of the following criteria: more than 250 employees
and more than $47.5 million in turnover than $23
million in balance sheet overall. A joint venture is
a business operation in which two or more firms
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have co-invested (Longman’s online dictionary).
Disruption is what a firm faces when the choices
that once drove a firm’s success now become those
that destroy its future (Gan, 2016). In this paper, the
authors define the disruptive era as the combination
of technological changes, hyper-competition caused
by new players' entrants, and global crises, which
combine them into multiple crises
How Large Established firms remain resilient in
the disruptive era?
To identify the organizational-resilience definition
and factors that affect it, the authors have reviewed the
literature. The search was based on 34 papers from the
Proquest and Google Scholar databases and filtered
the Published and Perished tools to find the relevant
papers (Hirsch h-index) with the search of “organizational resilience” or “resilient organization.” The
definitions and frameworks found are summarized
in Appendix II.
Two main concepts are found to develop organizational resilience. First, organizational resilience is a
combination of resilience as a feature, as an outcome,
and a measure of disturbance that an organization
can tolerate and persist (Ruiz-Martin et al., 2018).
Resilience as a feature refers to something owned by
the firm. Resilience as an outcome means something
an organization does. Second, combining reactive and
proactive capabilities can achieve organizational resilience—few scholars support this concept (Duchek,
2020: p.238; Madni and Jackson, 2009; Burnard and
Bhamra, 2011; Chu, 2015; Blanco and Botella, 2016).
Moreover, to be resilient, few factors affect organizations, such as capabilities built on-process (van
Breda, 2016; Tengblad and Oudhuis, 2018: p.235),
influencing elements, and organizational interventions (Xu and Kajikawa, 2018:p.239), that collectively
drive organizational resilience. While influencing
elements are characterized by the time they exert,
the system resilience, and the roots in which they
are constructed, they can be split into internal and
external, rapid or slow elements (Xu and Kajikawa,
2018:p.239).
Both elements (internal and external) can be split
into three stages: pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis.
Suppose the forces that influence the external element
increase and the company's capacities are adequate for
responding to external forces. The disturbance tolerance threshold of an organization (Limnious et al.,
2014) is not exceeded, then the organization persists.
However, if this is not the case, the organization might
fail (Xu and Kajikawa, 2018:p.241). This disturbance
tolerance refers to adaptive capacity, absorption, and
resistance to change (Limnios et al., 2014), which
means the degree to which current disturbances can
survive. The authors consider organizational legacy as
a mixture of adaptive capacity and absorption capacity
of Morais et al. (2018).
Dervitsiotis (2003) argues that organizations
should follow dual management modes to handle
periods of stability and periods of turbulence (quoted
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from Limnious et al., 2014: p.106) or, in the sense
of Hamel and Valikangas (2003), argued that management should have the capacity to change before
the change situation became apparent. Therefore, the
pre-crisis period can be divided into two timelines:
(1) adequate to find solutions to the crisis or stable
period; and (2) there is not enough time to find a
solution to the crisis.
Duchek’s (2020:p.238) findings show that only a
combination of three-stage capabilities can lead to a
resilient organization. The large resilient-organization
must have proactive abilities (anticipation capability)
and reactive abilities (ability to survive) and adapt,
supported by cognitive knowledge and behavior influenced by previous experience as the main antecedents.
Also, the availability of resources, social resources,
and power and responsibility are the main drivers. The
anticipation capabilities as the source of resilience are
further supported by few scholars (Rerup, 2001:p.1;
McManus et al., 2008:p.82; Teixeira and Werther Jr,
2003:p.333; Carayannis et al., 2014:p.458; Winnard et
al., 2014; Sawalha, 2015:p.347; Blanco and Botella,
2016:p.17).
As disruption takes time, incumbents also underestimate disruptors (new entrants) who construct
business models that are very different from incumbents (Christensen et al., 2016). The company fails
to adapt (Christensen, 2016:p. 97) and has no plans
to deal with it, affecting the revenue stream, under
threat when the disruption arises. Businesses are
losing freedom and capital in order to build radical
new opportunities.
The dilemma is that solving these opportunities for
disruption needs transformation—businesses founded
on these emerging models would work radically different from today's incumbent businesses. Contrary
to incremental innovation, citing Molina-Morales
(2017), disruptions create fundamental changes, technical developments, obviously divergent from current
activities (Ettlie, 1983; Ettlie, Bridges, and O'Keefe,
1984). Although the transformation is challenging,
existing (established) businesses are expected to
survive if they have the urgency and vision to get
ahead of the disruption. They need to anticipate it by
building awareness, beginning with understanding the
different global trends and industry forces to develop
a shared future view (Deloitte, 2016).
How Large Established Joint-Ventures remain
resilient after the disruptive era?
The challenges encountered in a joint venture are
typically more diverse than a non-joint venture since
two firms or more must work together to achieve
shared objectives. For example, inconsistencies in
the business plan, a mismatch between business
interests and priorities, lack of engagement, unclear
governance, issues with talent, and organizational
inefficiencies are some. In addition to challenges,
joint ventures can include several conveniences in
running a company, including risk-sharing, the opportunity to exit, obtain a larger market, acquire or share
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knowledge, or be used to address cultural, political, or
legal (international) constraints (Kent, 1991).
In the face of disruptive era challenges, the course
taken by a joint venture firm is almost the same as that
pursued by a non-joint venture company. A joint venture corporation has more benefits to deal with since it
combines the different firms’ strengths. However, this
will happen if the joint venture company can resolve
the various challenges mentioned above
Resilience Capabilities
In this section, the authors aim to examine the
information, the stages and the resources needed to
achieve resilience, and the accompanying theories.
Also, those capabilities that are built on the process
must be prepared to solve the crisis and must begin
even before the crisis occurs effectively when the
threat occurs and continues after the threat ends
(Duchek, 2020, William et al., 2017; Linnenluecke
et al., 2012; Alliger et al., 2015).
Capabilities of pre-crisis (Anticipation Capabilities)
Duchek’s framework can observe and identify and
prepare functions that are limited to predicting unexpected events. The authors see some drawbacks in this
model. If the organization has sensed a weak signal
(warning) of the threat, the company must respond
quickly to deal with the threat. One's framework does
not suggest any solution in this context. Preparations
for finding suitable alternatives at this stage were also
unanticipated. Therefore, it is essential to adapt the
Duchek (2020:p.224) framework, which focuses only
on three stages (pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis) of
the threat, without considering the stabilization period
as part of the threat stage of survival. Getting the right
views on these threats, whether sooner or later or
with a high or low impact, is essential to accurately
recognize the company's response to this threat or
crisis (Tengblad and Oudhuis, 2018).
Conversely, the ability to find solutions appears
when a crisis occurs. Nevertheless, it will always be
too late to face threats, and it will not be effortless
for the company to get past them. It is contrary to
other scholars’ concepts who argue that: at the precrisis stage, it is essential to develop solutions since
when a crisis happens is limited to improvisation
(Rerup, 2001:p.7). Furthermore, firms should have
taken steps to foresee potential risks. Such action
should be taken without first involving stakeholders (Xu and Kajikawa, 2018:p.248). Therefore, the
ability to observe and identify potential threats of
Duchek (2020:p.225) is still necessary, but they must
be followed by developing effective solutions to anticipate them. These appropriate steps should be taken
immediately so that damages, dangers, pressures, and
costs can be reduced when threats do occur (Ortizde-Mandojana and Bansal 2016).
The arguments referred to the above lead to the
following propositions:
P1a1: The more robust the ability to detect
threats and develop solutions, the stronger the
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company’s ability to face and anticipate potential
threats (Tengblad and Oudhuis, 2018: p.235).
P1a2: In the un-sufficient (short time) time to
create mitigation solution, the stronger the firmanticipation-capabilities being built in the process,
the more resilience of an organization.
P3: Identification and mitigation solution creation
increase anticipation capabilities.
P3a: The earlier an organization can recognize a
threat, the better it can minimize or respond to the
threat.
P3b1: The faster a solution is developed within
sufficient time, the more likely it will succeed.
P3b2: The earlier the implementation of mitigation
solution created in un-sufficient time, the more robust
organizational resilience.
P3c: The better the organization can identify,
analyze, plan, and create a solution, the better the
anticipation process.
P3d: At sufficient time to create a solution, the
anticipation processes will be enhanced by the anticipation mechanism's improved quality (Sub-Mech 1).
Capabilities of in-crisis (Coping Capabilities)
At this point, Duchek limits its ability to embrace
and creates, and executes solutions. The authors have
found some drawbacks in this definition. Companies
need to establish capabilities, such as assessment and
response strategies (Xu and Kajikawa, 2018:p.249).
For the assessment, it should be recognized that the
perception of disturbance is either rapid or slow to
respond either quickly or slowly (Xu and Kajikawa,
2018:p.248). Duchek (2020:p.224) suggested that
an aggressive response during a crisis and the willingness to resolve problems allow organizations
to respond well to disruptions and formulate and
execute solutions. The company must overcome
unexpected situations; this ability by Rerup is called
Improvisation (Rerup, 2001:p.7). He highlights that it
is necessary to assess the vulnerabilities in areas that
have not been historically tested or anticipated. In this
case, the mechanism needed is as follows: conducting an assessment and response strategy, designing
influential roles and responsibilities, coordinating
mechanisms, and identifying and implementing mitigating solutions. This mechanism is consistent with
the principle of power and responsibility put forward
by Duchek (2020:p.237), that is to say, the development of clear roles and responsibilities, following
the identification of assessments and response strategies, identifying specific roles and responsibilities
immediately.
The discussion referred to above leads to the following proposals:
P4: The more skilled organization has in the
Coping stage, the greater the coping process.
P4a: The more robust the mechanism's consistency, the greater the coping process, beginning with
the assessment and response strategies, the design of
appropriate roles and responsibilities, the creation of
coordination mechanisms, and the development and
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implementation of mitigating solutions.
Capabilities of post-crisis (AdaptationTransformation Capabilities)
This adaptation refers to adapting to post-crisis situations or making changes to organizational resilience
(Limnios et al., 2014) (quoted in Duchek, 2020:p.230).
The ability to reflect and learn at this stage is beneficial by reflecting on a crisis that is viewed as a
reflection process based on experience that has taken
place so that it is carefully and thoroughly evaluated.
Duchek’s intention refers to the adaptation as the willingness to adjust only by responding to circumstances
after the turbulence happened without emphasizing
the future's vision (Rowold and Schlotz, 2009: p.36).
In other words, organizations with adaptive capacities do not perceive the environment passively and
are rebuilt in understanding and acting on the environment to transform the conditions they adapt to.
Transformation helps organizations keep pace with
ever-changing demand and anticipate change (Staber
and Sydow, 2002: p.410). Therefore, adaptation shall
be followed by transformation since it allows organizations to keep up with change without neglecting a
sound and entrepreneurial strategic planning process
(Demmer et al., 2011).(as Figure 2).
Adaptation capability can provide insight into
past and present events in learning activities, which
serve as a guideline for future action (Daudelin, 1997:
p. 39), as cited by Duchek (2020:p.230). Changing
behavior after a crisis without cognitive development
will not be enough to improve the actors’ behavior.
Moreover, organizations must have an anticipatory or
proactive strategy that requires awareness and learning skills. This suggestion is in line with Tobing and
Fitriati's (2009: p. 27) results: companies’ characteristics of willingness to continue to learn deeply would
be prepared to grow and respond to changes in the
business environment.
Duchek (2020: p.232) argues that organizational
change is at the center of its stability (Ates and Bititci,
2011). Changes in response to unexpected circumstances, such as organizational transformations, may
lead to resistance. To address the resistance requires
significant adaptation (Dayton, 2004) and is rooted
in individual resistance (Seville, 2018). As organizations require individuals and teams to deal with the
crisis, employee strength must build organizational
resilience (Linnenluecke, 2017; Coutu, 2002). They
maintain the mental strength of employees (Luthans,
2002). If the motivation for work is low, it needs to
be improved (Duchek, 2020:p.232). In this context,
it is imperative to pay attention to the interaction of
followers with leaders.
Also, Xu and Kajikawa (2018:p.248) add that
while the system (organization) cannot restore
external disruptions, interventions such as adaptive
governance and management need to be modified
effectively. Adaptive governance is creating adaptation and change in socio-ecological environments,
but the process is relatively long (Walker et al. 2004).
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This discussion, therefore, leads to the following
proposition:
P1: The greater the organization's capabilities in
inseparable stages (anticipation, coping, adaptationtransformation), the more resilient the firm will be
(Duchek, 2020: p.232).
P1b: The greater the ability to cope, the more the
organization's resilience.
P1c: The more robust the capacity to adapt, which
is followed by transformation, the more resilient organization is.
P2a: The more anticipatory capability is built, the
greater the coping capability (Duchek 2020:p.232).
P2b: The more coping capability is built, the greater
the adaptation capability (Duchek, 2020:p.232).
Figure 2. Adapted framework based on Duchek (2020) and
Sydow (2002).

P2c: The more adaptation (transformation) capability is built, the greater the anticipation capability
(Duchek, 2020:p.232).
P5: The more consistency of the skills needed in
this phase (long-term management, modification of
strategic planning) is improved, the stronger the adaptation process (transformation).
P5a: The Adaptation & Transformation processes
will be enhanced by the mechanism's improved quality (Sub-Mech 3). Sub-mechanism 3 is the ability
to adapt through management changes, long-term
governance, strategic alignment and planning, the
maintenance of factors/components that play a role
in recovery and keep the system flexible.
P6: The more substantial the organizational
knowledge base, the more robust capabilities on
anticipation, coping, and adaptation-transformation
is (Duchek, 2020:p.235).
RESEARCH METHOD
This study is a case study using a deductive process-tracing method to test the framework. Process
tracing is used to grasp the HOW of cause and effect
and get a deeper understanding of theoretical concepts. As Derek Beach points out, tracing the steps
of the causal mechanism between X and Y is why
the authors would like to participate in the first place
(Trampusch and Palier, 2016); this is especially important in cases where longitudinal data is available.
Also, this method provides benefits such as: (1)
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if a process is to be traced, it can help to clarify the
mechanisms of change (Tulia Falli); (2) if it is mentioned that the context and time are essential (Beach
and Pedersen, 2013); (4) A researcher can make strong
within-case inferences about why an outcome came
about (Beach and Pedersen, 2013).
Contrarily to the benefits, the authors identified
some drawbacks, such as (1) the confusion of what
process-tracing methods are tracing (either minimalist
process-tracing or system process-tracing) and how
the authors know fair process tracing when the authors
see it in practice; (2) Identifying the right hypotheses about mechanisms is a challenge and depends
on theoretical and practical knowledge of the domain
under investigation; (3) How do we know when we
can end the analysis.
Figure 3. Method Process Flow

The sequence of Applied Method
The boxes are clarified as follows:
(1)Determine the correct candidates of the
respondents.
Yin's one-phase approach (Yin, 2014: p.95) is
used to test qualifying candidates: (1) they are senior
managers or retired senior managers in the organization (at least five years with the company); (2) the
selection of qualified informants using the snowball
effect: the CEO nominated another respondent, and
so on; (3) at least three clusters of informants of various qualifications (Management, Sales & Project and
Engineering); (4) As the information was searched in
1998/1999 (Asian Financial Crisis), the former Plant
Directors responsible for that time were selected as
qualified informants. Eight respondents were selected
based on the criteria listed above. The summary of
the respondents is shown in Appendix III.
(2) Data Collection
Authors conducted in-depth interviews to collect
information from respondents through face-to-face
or telephone interviews (Patrick and James, 2004:
p.262). The authors used two phases: (1) A pilot study.
Identify the business's challenges or anxieties and how
the company has succeeded in this turbulent era (the
authors interviewed four respondents representing the
first three clusters), starting in November 2018 till
July 2020. (2) The authors extended four additional
respondents responsible for the plant during those
crises and triangulated the details. During data collection, there was a helping situation in the interviewing
period because one of the authors had a specific role
in the organization and was an employee and a management member from 1992 to 1997.
The data collection was as follows: (1) the initial
condition of the organization to see the starting point
of the process; (2) the qualitative data contained the
declaration of the respondent. These data may be evidence of a process-tracing that needs two aspects: the
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necessary conditions and uniqueness, such as applying evidence to support or undermine the theory
(Collier, 2011: p.825).
The following questions were addressed in the
interviews: (1) What is the greatest challenge or threat
to the company? (2) What causes the threat to arise?
(3) How did the company survive such an adverse
situation? What intervention strategies are used to
ensure the resilience of the company? The tracing
process is necessary to verify if the respondents'
answers are related to the hypothesized processes
and the relevant claims.
(3) Identify and testing data
Process tracing is initiated based on theory and then
assesses the empirical data by contrasting case evidence with theoretical predictions. Researchers gather
evidence that is corroborating and contradictory and
determines the degree to which it is consistent with
the hypothesis. Process- tracers bring more emphasis
on dynamics and is less parsimonious in theorizing.
They are interested in analyzing change, process, and
feedback (Trampusch and Palier, 2016: p. 9).
As suggested by Patrick and James (2004: p.262),
the general stages of process tracing consists of four
stages: (1) Collecting data, as previously explained
in the Data Collection section. (2) Transcription,
integration, and segmentation of data are converted
into a timeline filter. (3) Coding. (4) Further analysis
and data representation from stage 3 (coding) will
be discussed. The next step is to analyze the threat/
crisis’s impact on the organization, where: the authors
indicate that the company faced crises as the cause
(apart from the initial state of the process, the challenges faced, how they faced them), and how they
remained resilient as an outcome (called o1).
The authors then discuss the effect of crises in the
context of the three stages of organizational resilience
in the second stage, particularly exploring how the
(hypothesized) causal mechanism processes in crises
that make a company survive. Next step, propositions
(including the mechanism) will be checked against
the evidence based on the data collection guidelines
(van Evera, 2017). The findings are weighed for each
part of the mechanism to create cases that provide
confidence. So any part of the mechanism exists or
is not related to the event.
Finally, the test results will be summarized in a
table to show if the evidence corroborates hypothesized propositions. After this step has been completed,
the analysis can be ended (Lieberman, 2005: 448)
(cited by Beach and Beach, 2017). Then, the next step
moves to the finding/ result (Box no (4)).
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Before the authors discuss the findings and link
them to existing theories, the authors need to reconfirm the meaning of Organizational Resilience.
Resilience is the capability of an organization to
return to its normal position before it is threatened

79

Figure 4. Verification flow of study in PT Alpha’s resilience
against crises

(Boin van Eten, 2013), the ability to prepare to face
threats and return to the original positions or be more
successful (Hamel Valikangas, 2003).
PT Alpha’s Case
The JV was established more than three decades
and had 350 employees with a turnover of more than
47.5 m$ provided by-products ranging from small
to very high-power capacity. The JV Partners' composition has evolved from the initial three partners
(two domestic and one foreign partner) to only two
partners in 2003. The foreign partner acquired all the
3rd shareholder’s portion, which causes it to have
the majority and provided technology management.
Meanwhile, the second party was a domestic partner
whose parent is an SOE.
Crises in PT Alpha
Based on the former pilot study, the company had
faced several crises and the most adverse situations as
the causes were summarized in Table III.1 (Appendix
IV) from 1998 to 2019. In this section, the company's
evolution of crises, the initial situation facing the
crisis, and the strategies carried out by the firm are
described below, followed by the applied mechanisms
by the company on each phase.
Crisis I –FC in 1998
The Asian financial crisis triggered this national
crisis, followed by Indonesia's political instability.
Civil riots/looting have contributed to Indonesia's
replacement and created the country in an uncertain
economic situation vast crisis. Affecting by country
and regional crisis, PT Alpha’s positioning (obtained
from Respondents R7 and R8) was: (a) Domestic
order declined to zero. (b) PT Alpha focused only
on high-profitability orders in the domestic market.
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(c) Business Unit 1 had extended to the overseas
market since 1996, such as Latin America, Europe,
and Africa.
The strategies to deal with the crisis were: (a)
Change the CEO; (b) 50% of the workforces were
laid off, followed by employee training to enable them
to cover such multiple positions by a worker. (c)
Declaring a sense of crisis, (d) Synergized between
BU 1 and 2 for cost-sharing (e) Focusing on a new
market: Repair, Replacement of windings, (f) Open
for lower profits opportunities domestically.
PT Alpha took two anticipatory measures as the
mechanism: (1) Identity, recognize and define the
anticipated level of resilience, (2) scanning capability,
market intelligence. Fortunately, PT Alpha expanded
in 1996 to reach overseas markets, which helped it
deal with the crisis (Duchek, 2020). This expansion
was beneficial to the revenues of PT Alpha when this
situation arose.
Former leaders' decisions have helped them navigate their organization outside the crisis (James and
Wooten, 2010). It confirms that organizations should
handle periods of stability and periods of instability (Dervitsiotis, 2003). In line with (Hamel and
Valikangas (2003), firms need to innovate or expand
before a crisis occurs) or experimenting to find a
place where no one has gone before (Reinmoeller
and van Baardwijk, 2005). This decision (of anticipation capabilities) helped the successor minimizes
the consequences (Madni and Jackson 2009), which
enlighted the firm to determine which strategies
should be formulated and executed. Furthermore,
the successor was the "former CEO," who already
familiar with PT Alpha's condition (who had led it
since 1990-1994) to take the right steps. Mechanism
2 and Mechanism 3 can both be applied appropriately.
These findings were verified, as shown in proposition
verification in Crisis II (Appendix V).
Crisis II - Recession 2008
The global financial crisis emerged in 2008 with
the epicenter in North America and Europe, including
Indonesia (with close relations to the two continents),
which affected the overseas and domestic markets
of PT Alpha. The great recession should have been
detected since the overseas markets' significant
declines had been faced—however, PT. Alpha Co
had not taken significant action (anticipation) to face
this threat. PT Alpha's initial state (obtained from
Respondents R6 and R7) were: (a) The company sustained a long period of loss (the profit was negative).
(b) BU2 (small to medium power capacity) did not
get any domestic order in the ongoing recession. (c)
Internal conditions did not help the company's condition since the factory facilities were quite old. (d)
The cost structure of employees was high since the
employee seniority with long tenure. (e) This situation put the firm could not make any layoffs or any
further investment.
The strategies were taken by the management as
follows: (a) Change of the Leadership by replacing the
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plant BU 2 director. (b) Performed strategic analysis
and problem formulation (c) Socialize the company's
sense of crisis and leadership’s objective. (d) Reduced
company costs by restructuring or cutting unnecessary costs; (e) Did not lay off since no available cost.
(f) Changing business models helped to reduce the
cost and improve profitability. (g) Changing company
governance; (h) Mapping the current business position and determining the next business orientation. (i)
Launch a niche product differentiation in industrial
markets.
For mechanism 1, PT Alpha took one anticipatory action: identifying, recognizing, and defining
the expected degree of resilience. PT Alpha knew
that there would be a recession signal, but sadly no
further action has been taken. However, the strategy
in Mechanisms 2 and 3 could still be applied since the
company's slack resources at the time of the recession
is still sufficient (sound finances, because the demand
for goods at BUI is still good). Despite expecting the
development of risks, The existing Leader of BU 2
did not anticipate much that would have caused the
costs and damages suffered by PT Alpha. Fortunately,
the successor had created the innovation on mediumrange products that helped PT Alpha have a new
money source. These findings were verified, as shown
in proposition verification in Crisis II (Appendix VI).
However, with a successor's expertise and the
firm’s slack resources, innovated new products
related to the industrial market had helped PT Alpha
to go through the crisis since the market demand was
still there (Reinmoeller and van Baardwijk, 2005).
Innovation and renewal as the source of organizational resilience then confirmed the findings (Hamel
and Valikangas, 2003; Walker and Salt, 2006; Carmeli
and Markman, 2011).
The strategy (a) was in line with William et al.
(2017) that in a crisis, some leadership styles are
more effective than others in helping organizations
to respond (Ballesteros and Wry; Bundi and Pfarrer,
2015; Stam et al., 2016). As factors that create
organizational resilience are changeable and varied
(Tengblad and Oudhuis, 2018:p.234), the action
effectiveness depends on the crisis stage and how
leadership style interacts (Bundy et al., 2017).
Strategy (b) was in line with Morais-Storz's (2018)
findings, who suggested that strategic resilience
depends on a recursive cycle of problem formulation,
innovation, and metamorphosis (change status quo).
Furthermore, be more open to the real problem as the
strategy (c) to employees and found a way out of the
problem. Leadership responses are critical to ensure
an organization's continued survival (Appelbaum et
al., 2012). Furthermore, the higher the cost of raw
materials, the greater the probability of organizational
failure (Esteve – Perez and Manez-Castillejo, 2008;
Gok et al.,2012)
Crisis III - in 2012
This outbreak occurred when the enormous customer requirement for product specifications in
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Business Unit 1 could not be fulfilled. It was caused
by the non-suitable facilities (factories) to meet the
specifications for high-performance goods, which
were safer, more reliable, and more advanced. In
reality, news of such a request had been heard since
2011. The management of PT Alpha has requested the
shareholders to raise their investment. Unfortunately,
the shareholders had not addressed it on time.
Therefore, PT Alpha's initial state (obtained from
Respondents R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, and R7) was: (a)
Since the primary customer’s products could not be
met, create any domestic revenue; therefore, revenue
solely was from foreign markets. (b) The product
did not meet the primary customer's new standards,
proved by the failure's first test. It created a significant
loss because they cannot be delivered and sold right
away. Finally, the first past test can be carried out in
2016. (c) Financial difficulties (a significant drop in
profitability, cash flow difficulties); (d) Disputes in
the business occurred between management and factory union (workers' demands could not be fulfilled).
(e ) Out of date factory, (f) PT Alpha BU2 was carved
by the corporate strategic action (this unit contributed
to the strong cash flow of PT Alpha). (g) Strong quality of employees. (h) Luckily, the proper relationship
with the primary client still existed.
The executed strategies to face this crisis as follows: (a) Change of Leadership; (b) Followed by the
factory manager replacement with someone more
assertive and respected;(c) Management was more
transparent to company problems; (d) Open comprehensive communication with employees, including
workers; (e) Fostering a sense of crisis in the company
environment; (f) Held a meeting with the staff is routinely every three months. (g) In 2014 the investment
demand was finally met, and a factory that met the
qualifications was finally built. (h) Develop new products suitable to the new standard of Primary client; (i)
Try not to reduce employees to avoid severance pay.
In this crisis, under mechanism 1, PT Alpha also
performs only one anticipatory action, namely to
identify, recognize and define the expected response
level. The demand for a new specification by the primary customer had been understood to have occurred.
However, the shareholders had underestimated it and
did not find a solution (revamped the factory). When
the plant was eventually agreed to build (in 2016), it
could not help PT Alpha get through the crisis since
it could not sell its products for about one year. PT
Alpha might face it if the factory as an anticipatory
stage was built and not as a mitigation step (meeting
the required specification). It seems the importance of
good relationships with owners should not be underestimated (Tengblad and Oudhuis, 2018:p.239),
The leadership may have caused this unpreparedness at the end of Crisis II because he could not
convince the shareholders to invest in the factory’s
revamping. Mechanism 3 is difficult to execute since
the strategy is delayed by the execution mechanism
2. Neglecting the importance of proactive behaviors
(Kickul and Walters, 2002), enactment (Smircich and

81

Stubbart, 1985), and the action-oriented perspective
sense-making (Weick, 1995) contribute to shaping
the very complexity in the environment they occupy
(Morais-Storz et al., 2018: p.1184).
Moreover, what was also important is that when a
crisis occurred, the atmosphere of the company is also
not supportive (disputes with workers). However, the
new leaders could immediately overcome this situation by opening good communication. It created a
sense of belonging to the company starting to grow.
This situation is very positive as social resources
- followers and relationships with unions, owners,
and other stakeholders, as the source of resilience
(Tengblad, 2018: p.40; Duchek, 2020: p.237). These
facts in Crisis III prove that the propositions shown
in Appendix VII (Findings of Proposition Verification
in Crisis III) are confirmed
Crisis IV – in 2015
This crisis was caused by an increasing number
of vendors in the domestic utility market, from two
to six players, followed by the client’s tender criteria
assessment. Unfortunately, PT Alpha's performance
and competitiveness had not been as good in the past,
especially in certain products. There was a fluctuation in the utility market, amplified by a shift in the
delivery model of PT Alpha's global strategy that
prohibited products from entering South and Latin
America. Meanwhile, the Pacific market has not been
able to do so since some quality issues in the past.
Crisis III's affected the firm's financial resources badly.
PT Alpha's initial state (R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, and
R7) was: (a) Orders declined dramatically as other
competitors emerged in the business; while, orders
were generated mainly the domestic market. (b) PT
Alpa‘s finances are in trouble (negative); (c) The plant
has been aligned with the current standard, but the
employee's work culture was still not consistently following the expected new plant requirement. (d) The
impact of crisis III has not been overcome completely,
mainly on financial difficulties. (e) PT Alpha had carried out a cost-out on their goods' cost to anticipate
these new entrants; (f) the innovation climate was
likely closed.
The response of PT Alpha in facing this crisis:
(a) Change of Leadership; (b) The new leader made
changes in the new management/team; (b) Produce
a more competitive product; (c) Focus on products
that have the performance and margins were good.
In this crisis, under mechanism 1, PT Alpha can
only conduct one anticipatory action, namely, to
identify, recognize, and define the expected level of
resilience. This situation might happen because when
it entered the crisis, Crisis III was not entirely over
and still had an effect. It did the cost-out activities,
but it could not resolve this crisis due to Crisis II's
effects. Furthermore, the plant has been revamped
based on qualifications, the factory workers' working culture has not been consistently maintained,
the former leader should immediately train the factory workers. This delay led PT Alpha to take a long
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time to match with the requirements, namely in
2016 (approximately four years since the request for
this specification appeared). Cited by Tengblad and
Oudhuis, 2018:p.240), employees require training and
coaching to handle challenging and stressful work
situations and maintain personal well-being (Hesketh
et al., 2015). Until completing PT Alpha research
in 2019, PT Alpha has not yet entirely recovered
from crisis IV. PT Alpha also acknowledged this (R1
and R7). While they did the cost-out as anticipatory
actions, cost-out might impact minimal, not a radical
change. Therefore, it could be said that the previous
leader underestimated the potential threat that eventually made PT Alpha experienced a crisis.
These facts in Crisis IV prove that the propositions
shown in Appendix VIII (Findings of Proposition
Verification in Crisis IV) are confirmed. This event
also proves the theory put forward by Duchek (2020),
which says that the willingness to resolve challenges helps organizations respond well to a crisis
disturbance. A quick decision coupled with prompt
responses is required at the in-crisis stage (Rerup,
2001).
From the above findings, few key factors play
significant roles. The transition of leadership in the
crisis is shown to have a significant influence. Once
the successor had little knowledge of the situation and
the threats, then, while threats continue to arise, they
do not anticipate them. Although PT Alpha did not
anticipate enough during Crisis II, PT Alpha could
survive since its slack resources were supportive.
Nevertheless, once the slack resources were terrible,
it has not helped the firm go through the crisis. If the
phases in Mechanism 1 are imperfectly implemented,
it is impossible to carry out the phases in Mechanism
2 and so on.
For all crises, leaders and followers played critical
Figure 5. Integrative Framework of Organizational Resilience
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roles in the company's resilience. Therefore, proposition P9: Leadership and Followership interplay
significantly influence organizational resilience is
approved. The stronger the interplay of leadership
and the followership, the stronger the capabilities of
anticipation, coping, and adaptation-transformation
processes. Stronger support for followership, even
by middle managers, can increase the likelihood that
catastrophes can be avoided (Tengblad and Oudhuis,
2018:p.240). Also, if leadership and followership are
based on a shared set of principles and strategies,
they are central elements in its culture (Andersson
et al. (2013).
The well-known brand of PT Alpha is still helping
to support during the crisis since the market still exists
in condition, it matches with clients qualifications (in
Crisis III). Proposition P7: The longer the company
holds the same brand, the easier it is for customers to
memorize it because if they need it, it will be at the
top of their minds in a condition that the customer
experience is also good.
Of course, this is inseparable from PT Alpha's
shareholders' role, who plays a significant role in it
(especially in developing overseas markets and investing in factory revamping). Therefore, the proposition
emerged P8: The more flexible the shareholders are
in supporting the organization with the markets, the
better the organization is in coping with the crisis.
All propositions discussed in the Literature Review
and the findings of proposed propositions (P7-P9) led
to the proposed integrative framework, as Figure 5.
Another significant point that the authors have
noticed is that PT Alpha has taken minimal anticipatory action in all the crises. It had significantly
impacted the mitigation and adaptation phases, mainly
if the situation (slack resources was low). This pattern
is shown by the magnitude of the effects of crisis II
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and crisis III. The anticipation phase can be essential
to a company's success in being resilient in the face
of a crisis. No matter how effective the mitigation and
adaptation plans are, the company must work extra
hard to succeed if the anticipation is not intense. It is
not uncommon for the costs to be incurred to a significant degree and impact its legacy, which affects
the anticipation stage.
This finding proves that a company achieves
resilience by its combination of three processes (i.e.,
Anticipation, Coping, and Adaptation-Transformation
stages) and inseparable (Proposition P1) as detailed
in Appendix II (Crises I up to IV). The hypothesized
causal sub-mechanisms (1 up to 3) verified the conditions as per the Table shown in Appendix II-IV.
Sub-mechanism 1 is very thin because, during the
study, several respondents indicated that not much had
been done. Sub-mechanism-1 thus consequences the
job of sub-mechanisms 2 and 3 much harder. It may
be argued that sub mechanism 1 is the foundation to
effectively resolving risks. In process tracing, this
situation is considered the minimalist understanding of where it may have happened since the works’
limitation to sub mechanism 1.
Meanwhile, the evidence is plentiful for sub mechanisms 2 and 3, but the results are not satisfactory
(mainly in crisis III and IV). In process tracing, those
situations are considered the system understanding
of where the evidence contributes significantly to
verifying hypotheses of which the causal links are
strongly verified. The proposed integrative framework
of organizational resilience for large established JV
has been confirmed based on the findings.
Another finding shows that every time (after Crisis
I) faced a crisis, PT Alpha could always identify a
threat, but PT Alpha was not ready when the threats
came. This situation could be due to the absence of
culture to transform and be flexible for future threats.
The findings are summarized in Appendix IX.
CONCLUSION
This paper aims to answer how large established
joint ventures remain resilient in a disruptive era. The
findings have shown that resilience is the combination
of anticipation, coping, adaptation-transformation,
and inseparable. The empirical evidence has confirmed that the capabilities built on the above process
enhance organizational resilience. However, if
anticipation does not become a "habit" in crisis management, prevention and adaptation/transformation
can become challenging.
Strengthening this process, the authors found
three causal mechanisms to face the crises in three
inseparable processes. Causal mechanisms 1, 2, and 3
support the anticipation, coping, and adaptation-transformation processes, respectively. In case a threat is
identified, late to execute the solution creates the JV
in a problematic situation (Crisis III and IV), which
had disconfirmed the previous conceptual framework (Duchek, 2020:p.225-228) that the solution
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development is still needed in the anticipation stage.
Therefore, the firm needs to extend a timeline for
the stability period, or Dervitsiotis (2003) said: ”dual
mode of management” (cited from Limnious et al.,
2014: p.106). This empirical evidence empowers the
authors to adjust Duchek’s framework by enhancing
the anticipation capabilities to provide the additional sub mechanism 1 to anticipate if the timeline
is sufficient to create a solution. When the time is
still sufficient or in the period of stability, before any
crisis occurs, crisis-I evidence has proved that these
actions help the firm during the crisis period, notably
to support its healthiness.
Moreover, it has been proved that sub-mechanism-2
has fostered the organization's coping capabilities.
Likewise, the recovery and transformation capabilities have been confirmed by sub-mechanism 3.
These three sub-mechanisms have contributed to the
resilience of PT Alpha. Finally, the more flexible the
shareholders, the better the organization is in coping
with the crisis
Implication and Suggestion
Theoretical Implication
This study's findings also imply the organizational resilience theory developed by Duchek based
on its conceptual framework. Empirical evidence has
confirmed that organizational resilience is enhanced
by a combination of 3 phases of crises and inseparable (Duchek, 2020:p.232). The framework needs
to include a period of stability or sufficient time to
find a solution by considering innovation. It is also
necessary to extend this process's capabilities by considering the solution developed during the preparation
process to anticipate the crisis.
Managerial Implication
This study will help firm managers consider the
capabilities and strategies built on these three processes, starting from the stage before any disturbance,
substantially innovate during the stability period to
expand the market to create new products (Dervitsiotis,
2003). Also, organizations must build capacity in
the processes as suggested in Sub-Mechanisms 1, 2,
and 3. Findings have shown that it is crucial to have
updated leadership capabilities to respond to such
threats (William et al., 2017; Ballesteros and Wry;
Bundi and Pfarrer, 2015; Stam et al., 2016); otherwise,
they need to be adjusted. It will be vulnerable to survival without a vital interaction between leadership
and followers (Tengblad and Oudhuis, 2018:p.240).
As discussed throughout this article, the next crisis
is just around the corner for the company. Without
the proper lessons learned and anticipated, mitigated
plans or solutions, organizations repeat the same mistakes that face the crisis (Appelbaum et al., 2011).
Recommendation include Future Research
This study's framework covers most likely a joint
venture firm where one of the shareholders is an SOE
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and the products' users. It will be open if this framework can be researched for other segments. It is also
useful to compare with other types of shareholder’s
characteristics.
In this study, the authors have not focused on keeping the system (organization) flexible. The authors
trace that it is critical from the moment before the
crisis till the crisis period. The next process in the
stable period is not examined in this paper. It is crucial
to see it on this organizational resilience. If it can be
extended to a comparative case study, it will help
generalize the situation. Besides, it will anyhow be
open to more studies in other segments.
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Appendix III (Summary of Interviews in PT Alpha)

89

90

BISNIS & BIROKRASI: Jurnal Ilmu Administrasi dan Organisasi, May 2021
Appendix IV(Table III.1 Summary of Crises faced by PT Alpha)

Appendix V(Findings of Proposition Verification in Crisis 1)

Volume 28, Number 2

TARIGAN, SIMATUPANG, BANGUN, HOW LARGE-ESTABLISHED JOINT VENTURE

Appendix VI(Findings of Proposition Verification in Crisis 2)
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Appendix VII(Findings of Proposition Verification in Crisis 3)
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Appendix VIII(Findings of Proposition Verification in Crisis 4)
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Appendix IX(Summary of Crises Findings)

Volume 28, Number 2

TARIGAN, SIMATUPANG, BANGUN, HOW LARGE-ESTABLISHED JOINT VENTURE

Appendix X (Verification of Mechanisms based on respondents views)
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